Forasmuch as there is nothing more delightful to a Man, than to find that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those Words are most grateful to the Ear, that make a man seem to see before his Eyes the things signified.
"Rhetorick, that Faculty, by which we understand what will serve our turn, concerning any Subject to win belief in the hearer. Of those things that beget belief; some require not the help of Art; as Witnesses, Evidences, and the like, which we invent not, but make use of; and some require Art, and are invented by us. The belief that proceeds from our Invention, comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker; partly from the passions of the hearer: but especially from the proofs of what we alledge."
AA
@misc{duede2021place,
title={Being Together in Place as a Catalyst for Scientific Advance},
author={Eamon Duede and Misha Teplistkiy and Karim Lakhani and James Evans},
year={2021},
eprint={2107.04165},
archivePrefix={arXiv},
primaryClass={cs.DL}
}
customized author surveys— authors include the survey in the paper. Includes such questions as: "How well do you know this paper? How much did this referenc influence the research choices in your paper?"
scientist’ s own papers
Recent high-profile commentar y argues that there is no suppor t for creati ve contributions catalyzed by being together in place 4 . But prior work implies that geograph y may still matter . Distance has been found to be a significant factor in conditioning collaboration.
Yet, it remains unclear whether the physically proximate , nearb y work we are more likely to cite is impor tant for our own work, or simply a curious but ornamental allusion.
moving forward
Our investigation demonstrates that sharing an institution is a critically important mesoscale for intellectual exposure and influence between the micro-scale of sharing an office, hallway, or department and the macro-scale of sharing a city, state, or country. This level matters more than any other for facilitating the transfer of influence in science by promoting occasions for interaction between diverse intellectual viewpoints through committees, seminars, gyms, and dining halls—the work of the university and the often insular communities that serve them. At the micro-scale of the office next door and the macro-scale of the international scientific congress, researchers interact with others more intellectually similar to themselves. The value of critical mesoscales has been observed in online communities like Wikipedia where the institutional constraint of a single article for a single topic—the work of producing an encyclopedia—necessitates interaction between diverse viewpoints, which is in turn associated with higher quality encyclopedia articles.[3][4]"
For each discipline, we identified all research articles published in the years 2000, 2005, and 2010 and ranked them according to the number of citations they had accrued through 2015.
Mixed-bundling of groceries and gasoline is common, but it raises ‘predatory’ concerns. This paper extends the standard Hotelling approach to consider bundled discounts when two conglomerates and an independent gasoline retailer compete. We show that bundling may result in exit and analyze the effects of capping discounts—a regulatory solution adopted in Australia. The optimal cap depends on the regulator’s objective and the potential for exit. When unregulated discounting leads to exit, an intermediate cap maximises consumer surplus. A cap also ensures that no consumer is worse off with the discounts, an outcome that does not occur with unregulated discounts.My summary:
For the purpose of our welfare analysis we consider three alternative objectives that may motivate a regulator’s intervention. The first is a ‘total welfare’ objective—the objective of maximizing the sum of consumer and producer surpluses across the two markets. The second is a ‘consumer welfare’ objective that considers only consumer surplus. The third and final objective is a ‘no disadvantage’ objective in which the goal is to maximize the welfare of consumers individually (as opposed to collectively) subject to the con - straint that no consumer should be worse off when compared to the baseline ‘no-bundling’ case. We show that, absent exit, regulatory intervention can be rationalised by both the ‘total welfare’ and ‘no disadvantage’ objectives. However, while a regulator that wants to maximize total welfare will impose an outright ban, a regulator who wants to maximize the welfare of individual consumers, subject to a no disadvantage constraint, will choose an intermediate cap.
I. INTRODUCTION MIXED-BUNDLING OF GROCERIES AND GASOLINE IS COMMON in a range of coun- tries including Australia, the U.S., the U.K., and parts of Europe.1 However, the bundle discounts can be controversial. For example, in 2008, the United States Court of Appeals reversed a District Court decision that awarded damages for predatory behavior against Dillon Companies (a subsidiary of Kroger Co.).2 The defendant offered dis- counts on gasoline to grocery customers. The discounted gas price was, at times, below cost, even though the bundle of groceries and gas were profit- able. On this basis, the Appeals Court found that the bundle discounts were not predatory. Kroger has since extended the program, in partnership with Shell, to a variety of U.S. cities.3
For the purpose of our welfare analysis we consider three alternative objectives that may motivate a regulator’s intervention. The first is a ‘total welfare’ objective—the objective of maximizing the sum of consumer and producer surpluses across the two markets. The second is a ‘consumer welfare’ objective that considers only consumer surplus. The third and final objective is a ‘no disadvantage’ objective in which the goal is to maximize the welfare of consumers individually (as opposed to collectively) subject to the con - straint that no consumer should be worse off when compared to the baseline ‘no-bundling’ case. We show that, absent exit, regulatory intervention can be rationalised by both the ‘total welfare’ and ‘no disadvantage’ objectives. However, while a regulator that wants to maximize total welfare will impose an outright ban, a regulator who wants to maximize the welfare of individual consumers, subject to a no disadvantage constraint, will choose an intermediate cap.